Security / AI / Reality
01

Cybersecurity Is Dead

Exploit got cheaper, faster, and ....

The human in the loop
02

Who
I am

Builder / Breaker

Speaker portrait in black and white
The asymmetry
03

AI makes security unequal.

Attackers pick one target.Defenders cover everything.

Published CVE records / calendar year 7.5× in 10 years
Published CVE records from 2016 through 2025 Annual published CVE records increased from 6,457 in 2016 to 48,244 in 2025. A vertical marker at November 2022 identifies the public launch of ChatGPT as context, not causation. 50K 25K 0 PUBLIC LLM ERA CHATGPT · 30 NOV 2022 6,457 25,059 48,244 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Timeline marker only · not causation
Economics of repetition
04
One automated runApprox.
$3 - 4

Less than a slice of cake.

Not every exploit. Not every model. But cheap inference makes failed attempts disposable.

The disclosure gap
05

The exploit can arrive before the advisory.

FixA maintainer patches quietly.
DiffA bot watches every public commit.
InferThe changed path reveals the bug.
ExploitPoC now. Advisory later.
Trust, inherited
06

We are built on top of a supply chain...

Your appthe visible layer
Frameworkstrusted by default
Packagesupdated constantly
Models + dataopaque artifacts
Unknown maintainerone token away
New system. New failure modes.
07

AI created a new attack surface.

01

Prompt
injection

Untrusted content becomes an instruction.

02

Rogue
agents

A model with tools turns confusion into action.

03

Backdoored
models

Weights and serializers become executable supply chain.

08
Closed

A few companies can gate access, training, telemetry, and policy.

Open

Everyone can inspect and build - but provenance, poisoned data, and model integrity become your problem.

Looks equal. Isn't.
The talent paradox
09

Engineers have never mattered more.

AI replaces amplifies engineers.

AI lowers the floor.
Engineering judgment raises the ceiling.

Live case study
10

Build →
Break.

One short demo.

Build the feature.
Find the assumption.
Turn it into impact.

CodeAttackLesson
A practical ending
11

What do we do?

Assume the attacker automates first.
Verify every supply-chain artifact.
Give agents the minimum possible power.
Test models like production code.
Invest in engineers who understand systems.

Make attacks expensive again.